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HOW TO SHARE OUR RISKS EFFICIENTLY? PRINCIPLES




The efficient organisation of social insurance is an important problem for modern societies. The
paper discusses evidence that shocks in labour income have largely persistent effects and analyses
the implications of this observation for the optimal design of institutions for wage contracting,
social security, and pensions. In an optimal contract, wages reflect variations in individual pro-
ductivity for incentives reasons. However, the optimal contract insures workers against firm spe-
cific shocks. These can better be born by shareholders who can diversify risks on capital mar-
kets. Progressive income taxation provides further insurance. On top of that there is scope for
additional insurance based on ‘verifiable’ information on unemployment and health conditions.
As final form of ‘insurance’, the paper analyzes the role of self-insurance. Income shocks can
be absorbed partially by precautionary saving. The individual’s saving plans for retirement and
for precaution are, therefore, related issues. In an institutional setting with mandatory saving for
retirement, an integration of disability and unemployment insurance on the one hand and the
pension system on the other hand in a lifetime savings account allows for this interrelation. The
paper analyzes how to deal with the uncertainty in the return on savings in the framework of a
lifetime saving account.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In November 1942, William Beveridge published his famous report on social
insurance. It provided probably the first comprehensive plan for a social insur-
ance system. Its recommendations were based on three guiding principles.
The first principle is that any proposal should benefit from all experience
gathered in the past, but should not be tuned to vested interests. The second
principle is that social insurance should be viewed as part only of a wider eco-
nomic policy, to further social progress and to eliminate all kind of hazards.
The third principle is that social security is not solely a responsibility of the
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state, but also of the individual. In organising social security, the state should
not stifle private incentives, opportunities, and responsibilities. It should leave
room and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual to provide
more than social security income for himself and his family. The Beveridge
report turned out to be the roadmap to the organisation of social security in
the aftermath of World War II.
With benefit of the hindsight, the importance of the third principle was
probably understated at that time. During the period of Eurosclerosis in the
seventies and eighties of the previous century, the European social security
system turned out to provide too little incentives for the economy to recover
from the oil price shocks. Unemployment surged, and most countries started
a reconstruction programme of the social security system to enhance incen-
tives, in some countries with more success than in others. Though the direc-
tion of this reconstruction was clear – providing less insurance to reduce the
moral hazard problem – there was no grand design for the type of institutions
that could lead a country to the “production” frontier of insurance and incen-
tives. It might be time to take up the first principle of the Beveridge report,
and combine our experience of the past decades and the fruits of extensive
scientific research in income dynamics and optimal insurance to rethink the
design of the social security system.
This paper is a contribution to this project. We combine both empirical
and theoretical insights, on wage formation, optimal insurance, precaution-
ary saving, consumption planning, and portfolio choice to lay down principles
for the optimal design of social security. As our starting point we choose the
consumption and investment plans that are derived from the maximization
of an individual’s expected lifetime utility. We then ask ourselves how insti-
tutions can be helpful in the implementation of these optimal consumption
and investment plans.
As our starting point we choose the empirical estimates of the process of
income dynamics over the lifecycle. These estimates are remarkably similar
across countries. Most of the uncertainty in labour income is caused by per-
manent shocks affecting the income flow for the rest of the career. This result
has far reaching implications for the organization of social security, since it is
much harder to insure against permanent than against transitory shocks.
A proper system of wage setting contributes to the provision of insur-
ance in a society, by making maximum use of the ability of capital markets
to diversify firm specific risks. Progressive income taxation provides further
insurance. To the extent that there is verifiable information on unemploy-
ment and health conditions and that this information can be applied for
offering additional unemployment and disability insurance. Beyond that, only
self-insurance is helpful. An individual’s optimal consumption plan allows
for precautionary saving. The effect of shocks in income on consumption is
smoothed be variations in the saving rate. It turns out that two statistics, ratio
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of saving to current income and age, are sufficient statistics for the determi-
nation of the optimal consumption plan.
In theory, self-insurance would not require any additional institutions
beyond well functioning capital markets. Individuals can lend and borrow
themselves. In practice, even well trained economists are unable to do the
calculations for that properly. This was probably the reason for societies to
introduce pension funds in the first place. In this paper I take their existence
for granted. My goal is merely to analyze how the policies of these funds
can help participants to solve their lifetime consumption planning problem.
An obvious idea is to extend their role to include self-insurance for unem-
ployment and disability in their policy for setting contribution rates. Pension
funds have information on the sufficient statistics to calculate optimal con-
sumption plans.
Finally, the paper addresses the issue of how pension funds should deal
optimally with the aggregate risk in a society. What should the lifetime risk
profile of an individual look like? Can the aggregate risk be shared between
generations beyond contemporaneous capital market transactions, by letting
future generations share in today’s aggregate risk? Youngsters should bear the
main part of this risk, simply because their combined human and physical
capital is higher than that of older generations. Current capital market insti-
tutions do not seem to allow this, because human capital is not considered
appropriate as collateral.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses some evidence
on the stochastic dynamics of income during the lifecycle. Section 3 deals
with the role of wage formation. Section 4 discusses how to optimally deal
with permanent shocks to labour income. This section investigates the idea of
integrating the unemployment and disability insurance with the provision of
pensions for retirement. Section 5 deals with society’s aggregate risk. Section 6
concludes.
2 THE EMPIRICS OF INCOME DYNAMICS
There is substantial evidence that log individual income (= wages, for the
majority of the people) can be well approximated by a random walk with
transitory shocks, see e.g. Abowd and Card (1989), Topel and Ward (1992),
and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) for the US, Buhai et al. (2008) for Denmark
and Portugal:
wt =ut +et (1)
where wt is an individual’s log wage at time t , where ut and et are individ-
ual specific i.i.d. random variables with variances σ2u and σ
2
e , respectively, and
where  is the first difference operator; ut measures the permanent and et
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the transitory shocks. In this analysis, aggregate shocks are filtered out by
including time fixed effects. Equation (1) implies that individual’s wage gets
two types of shocks each year, a transitory shock that dies out in a year, and
a permanent shock that will affect her wage during the rest of her working
career. The permanent shock of this year does not depend on the size of past
shocks. From a laymen’s perspective, the size of these shocks seems remark-
ably large. Within a job spell, both σu and σe are of the order of magnitude of
10%, implying that the combined effect of permanent and transitory shocks
shifts your wage up or down on average by 17% over a period of one year,
by 30% over a period 7 years, by 40% over 14 years, and 60% over 34 years.
These numbers show the amount of risk workers face during their career, and
hence, the large demand for insurance these risks generate. The size of these
shocks is remarkably similar across countries. During the transition from one
job to another, shocks are substantially larger, see Buhai and Teulings (2007)
for the US. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) show that volatility is clustered in
time (ARCH). Though they do not relate these clusters of volatility to job
transitions, my work with Buhai suggests that these transitions are the main
source. Averaging over both job transitions and within job changes, both σu
and σe are of the order of magnitude of 15–20% per year for the United
States. Estimates for other countries yield a remarkably similar pattern.
The above representation of income dynamics as a combination of per-
manent and transitory shocks has not been remained undisputed. Guvenen
(2007) reports evidence for a different pattern of shocks:
wt =qt +vt + et
vt =ρvt−1 +ut (2)
where q is a random variable, which differs between individuals but is
constant over her lifetime and where ρ is a parameter; q captures heteroge-
neity in the return to experience between individuals, that is unobserved to
the econometrician, but that may or may not be observed by the individual.
When ρ = 1 and Var(q) = 0, we are back to the model of Eq. (1). There is
clear cut evidence for observed heterogeneity in the return to experience: it is
a well known regularity that the return to experience goes up with the level of
education. It turns out to be difficult to establish whether there also is unob-
served heterogeneity. In other words, it is difficult to disentangle model (1)
and (2) empirically, since they yield very similar patterns of dynamics. How-
ever, model (2) generates a much smaller demand for insurance, since most
of the ex post heterogeneity in outcome is determined ex ante, by the return
to experience u. When individuals know their return to experience, the only
remaining uncertainty is the transitory shock e. The model used by Meghir
and Pistaferri (2004) encompasses both model (1) and (2). They show that
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TABLE 1 – PERMANENT AND TRANSITORY INCOME SHOCKS PER EDUCA-
TIONAL GROUP
High school High school College
drop out (%) graduate (%) graduate (%)
Transitory shock 23 16 7
Permanent shock 18 17 21
Total shock after
1 year 38 28 23
7 years 58 50 56
14 years 76 66 79
34 years 111 100 122
Source: calculated from Meghir and Pistaferri (2004, Table III).
The numbers in the table give the effect of on log income. The relative effect on
income is then ex − 1, which is approximately equal to x for small x . However, for
larger x , e.g. x =1 and x =−1, we have e1 −1=171% and e−1 −1=−63%.
model (1) can explain the data well. One does not need unobserved heteroge-
neity in the return to education to explain the data. From the point of view
of social insurance, the permanent shocks matter most. A transitory shock of
10% of your yearly income is regrettable, but fades away. A permanent shock
of the same size has a much larger effect on your lifetime income. Indeed,
as pointed out by Low et al. (2006), the effect of unemployment on lifetime
income tends to be small compared to disability. When thinking about social
security, permanent shocks to wt are, therefore, a more important factor than
a temporary spell of unemployment. The social security systems that have
been build up since the publication of the Beveridge report do exactly the
opposite. Hence, there is demand for a modernization of these systems.
Apart from the differences in the return to experience, Meghir and Pis-
taferri report another important difference between educational groups, see
Table 1. For high school drop outs, transitory shocks are more important,
while for college graduates, the permanent shocks matter most. Furthermore,
shocks seem smallest for the middle group of high school graduates. I am
unaware of similar studies for other countries than the US, but I would
guess that similar patterns would emerge for other countries. A rough inter-
pretation of these differences relates to two theoretical notions. The differ-
ence between high school drop outs and high school graduates relates to the
notion of a dual labour market, where high school drop outs are confined
to the secondary segment of insecure jobs with hardly any employment pro-
tection, which yields large transitory shocks in income by sudden unemploy-
ment spells. High school graduates are protected from these transitory shocks
by permanent contracts. The difference between high school drop outs and
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college graduates relates to notions of endogenous growth and the knowl-
edge economy. College graduates have to specialize their human capital by
investing in a particular type of innovation. Success in the one innovation
provides the starting point for the next innovation, so that shocks have per-
manent effects on future income. Though these differences have a modest
impact on the actual amount of risk, see Table 1, they suggest that college
graduates need a different type of social security than high school drop outs,
with a much larger focus on long run uncertainty due to the random depre-
ciation of their human capital than on short run unemployment risks. Mod-
ernization is most needed for the college graduates.
3 THE ROLE OF WAGE FORMATION
Let us concentrate somewhat further on the permanent shocks. The perma-
nent shock can be decomposed in three independent components:
ut = it +β ft + δmt (3)
where it measures shocks to the value of the worker’s general human capi-
tal, ft measures firm specific shocks affecting the well being of the firm as
a whole, and mt measures match specific shocks, or alternatively, the worker’s
comparative advantage at this firm; β and δ measure the share of these shocks
that goes into wages. When the firm looses 10% of its market share, this
translates into a negative shock ft . When a worker has a fight with her boss
or when she does not understand the specifics of the firm’s production pro-
cess, this translates into a negative shock mt . Together, ft and mt measure
the evolution of the value of the firm specific human capital. When the firm
does well, but the worker does not understand the production process, the
firm specific human capital is small. The same applies in the opposite case,
where the worker is the right man for the job, but there is no market for the
output of that job.
The question is what β and δ should be, see Buhai et al. (2008) and Boven-
berg and Teulings (2008). A specific investment in the relation between a
worker and her employer leads to a surplus of the continuation of the match
relative to what the worker and the firm could get on the outside market
after breaking up their relation. How to distribute this surplus between the
worker and the firm is in principle an open question. Any value of β and
δ between zero and unity is conceivable. As long as we observe the Hosios
(1990) condition, that the cost of investment should be shared between the
worker and the firm in the same proportion as the surplus generated by
this investment, the efficient outcome is realized, provided the worker is risk
neutral, which obviously she is not. Other things equal, it is, therefore, best
to let the firm bear the full cost of the investment, and consequently to
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attribute to it the full surplus generated of these investments, β= δ=0. There
are two reasons for this. First, the firm’s shareholders can diversify their port-
folio on the capital market. Hence, from the point of view of insurance, they
are much better equipped to bear firm specific risk than workers, who can-
not diversify the firm specific component in wages. Second, as an implication
of the first argument, the firm’s cost of capital for this investment are lower,
because it can charge a smaller risk premium due to the shareholders capac-
ity to diversify the risk on the capital market. This yields a plea for a zero
return to tenure (or seniority, we get to that below), and worker’s wage at the
job being equal to the starting wage at the best alternative job that she can
get, leaving the full surplus to the firm.
Regrettably, this outcome cannot be easily implemented, for two reasons.
First, it may be hard to shift the full cost of specific investment to the worker.
Some of the effort spend to acquire the firm specific human capital might be
hard to observe, or at least, hard to verify, so that the firm cannot directly
compensate the worker for her effort. The only option then is to attribute
worker’s part of the match specific return, δ > 0. This is the standard trade
off between insurance and incentives, see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987).
As standard in this type of models, the optimal contract should provide the
workers less than first best incentives for effort, due to the trade off between
incentives and insurance. On top of this consideration, the worker’s higher
cost of capital reduces the effectiveness of these incentives, which further
reduces the second best value of δ. It would be an interesting research topic
as to what is the second best value of δ, but I am unaware of any study on
this topic.
Note that β should be zero according to this argument, in particular in
large firms: since a single worker has only a marginal effect on the perfor-
mance of a large firm, making her pay contingent on the firm’s performance
does not contribute much to her incentives and reduces her insurance. This
system is known as benchmark competition: the firm uses the average pro-
ductivity of its worker to correct the individual worker’s productivity for firm
level effects. However, there is a caveat. Both ft and mt are measured rela-
tive to a market average of ft = mt = 0. Let Ft and Mt be the accumulated
values of ft and mt since the start of the job till time t . At the moment of
job start, Ft + Mt must have been approximately zero, because if they were
below zero, the worker would have picked another job to start working, and
if they were above zero, the firm would have hired the worker before. Stated
differently, competition on the labour market pushes Ft + Mt to zero in new
jobs. Now, as long as Ft + Mt >0, there is a joint surplus for the worker and
the firm for the continuation of their employment relation. However, from
the point of view of the worker, continuation makes sense only as long as
β Ft + δ Mt > 0, since that is the wage she can collect in another job. This
is known as the participation constraint: the worker must have incentives to
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participate in the project of the firm. It is easy to see, that as long as one
restrains oneself to linear contracts (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987) provide
arguments for doing that), the only option to guarantee that whenever there
is a joint surplus, Ft + Mt >0, then it is attractive for the worker not to quit,
β Ft + δ Mt > 0, is to set β= δ. Hence, there is a three fold trade off between
(i) the desire to safeguard workers from the firm specific risk ft by applying
benchmark competition, β=0, (ii) the desire to provide the worker incentives
for the acquisition of firm specific human capital, δ > 0, and (iii) the desire
to satisfy the participation constraint, β= δ. One can expect that for an opti-
mum, the worker should be at least to some extent an implicit shareholder of
her own firm, β>0.
Apart from the fact that the worker should have some incentives for the
acquisition of firm specific human capital, there is a second reason why it is
difficult to attribute the full surplus to the firm by setting β = δ = 0. This is
the inability of workers to commit ex ante on setting β = 0, that is, on not
demanding a higher wage in case the firm’s profits are high. It is hard for
workers to resist this temptation when that moment comes by. Buhai et al.
(2008) analyze a model where senior workers (that is: workers with higher
tenure than their colleagues) have the bargaining power to capture part of the
excess profits. They show empirically that β>0 counts for both Denmark and
Portugal. Other evidence summarized in Teulings and Hartog (1998) shows
that wages depend more on the profitability of the firm, the more so in coun-
tries like the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, than in Scan-
dinavia and the Netherlands, suggesting that β is larger in the former than
in the latter group of countries. It is tempting to conclude that these differ-
ences are due to the institutions for wage formation, where the latter group
has some form of coordination in wage setting, while the former has not.
This discussion has revealed some complications in the trade off between
incentives and insurance. The empirical evidence shows a substantial amount
of heterogeneity where countries end up in this trade off. A proper “choice”
of β and δ contributes to efficient social insurance. However, the word
“choice” suggests an excessive amount of freedom in picking the values for
β and δ. Both parameters are a reflection of the institutions for wage set-
ting, both at the aggregate and the individual level. These institutions are
not simply “chosen” by a country, they have emerged through its social eco-
nomic history. The conclusion is that these institutions matter for insurance
squares well with the observation that there is a high cross country cor-
relation between the inequality in disposable income and the inequality in
gross wages. Apparently, the institutions for wage setting matter a lot for the
amount of insurance a country can provide.
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4 RISKS, SELF-INSURANCE AND INTEGRATE SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
Though wage setting institutions can reduce the risk faced by an individual
worker somewhat, the individual will face a substantial amount of income
uncertainty. Hence, there is a demand for further insurance. Progressive taxa-
tion acts as a redistribution device between individuals, but also as an insur-
ance device for the risk that individual faces in the evolution of her lifetime
income. Let log disposable income dt satisfy:
dt =d0 +τwt (4)
where τ is the coefficient of residual income progression (the ratio of one
minus the marginal tax rate by one minus the average tax rate). In a pro-
gressive tax system, 0< τ< 1, so that a one per cent increase in gross wages
leads to less than a per cent increase in disposable income. Empirically, τ is
around 0.85. Progressive taxation provides additional insurance, but under-
mines worker’s incentives for investment in human capital. We take the coef-
ficient for residual income progression as given here. One can assume that
societies have experimented with a proper value of this coefficient such that
it strikes a reasonable balance between their preference for insurance and
redistribution on the one hand and incentives on the other hand. It is not
necessary to take a stance on this issue for topic of this paper, the optimal
insurance of lifetime income. Since wt follows a random walk, so does log
disposable income.
Without further information regarding the nature of shocks, insurance
above what is provided by the tax system is infeasible since the insurer lacks
the information to monitor the validity of a claim on income support. The
Dutch experience with disability insurance during the eighties underlines the
practical relevance of this conclusion. Disability was defined broadly during
this period. It was a “catch all” concept, covering any cause that reduced
worker’s productivity below a level attained earlier on in the career. Even a
declining marketability of the specific skills of the worker was counted under
this heading. In that sense, disability could well be understood as a sequence
of consecutive negative shocks ut to the worker’s wage. It is difficult for the
insurance company to distinguish between outside shocks to a worker’s pro-
ductivity and lack of effort. Since the tax system already provides some insur-
ance for the case that no further information is available, there is probably
not much role for a separate disability insurance when no verifiable informa-
tion on the nature of the shocks is available.
Above that, the only option that is left is to benefit from self-insurance.
At first sight, this type of insurance seems to be of little value here, since
the main source of uncertainty is permanent shocks. For a transitory shock,
it makes sense to reduce future consumption to avoid a fall in consumption
today due to a temporary low income. For a permanent shock, this does
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not make sense, since the shock affects today’s and future income alike. Nev-
ertheless, self-insurance raises the individual’s lifetime utility via precaution-
ary saving. Calculations by Gourinchas and Parker (2002) suggest that the
amount of precautionary saving is substantial. Suppose that an individual
has zero assets and receives an income, of which the future evolution is gov-
erned by geometric random walk. The optimal consumption plan of that indi-
vidual is then to save some money for tomorrow, even though this implies
that expected consumption tomorrow exceeds consumption today, because the
excess utility cost of low future consumption in a bad state of the world
(when marginal utility of consumption is high) is larger than the utility gain
of raising today’s consumption (when marginal utility is of consumption is
average). Hence, the optimal strategy implies an upward drift in expected con-
sumption, see Caballero (1990).
A complete characterization of this consumption path can be derived from
solving a stochastic partial differential equation. Two examples with explicit
solutions of this differential equation are given in Caballero (1990) for the
case with uncertainty in labour income and a Constant Absolute Risk Aver-
sion (CARA) utility function and Teulings and De Vries (2006) in this journal
for the case with uncertainty in capital income and a Constant Relative Risk
Aversion (CRRA) utility function. However, in general, this equation has no
closed form solution. For the case of a constant relative risk aversion utility
function and evaluated at the point where the individual has not yet accumu-
lated any savings, the optimal upward drift in consumption can be shown to
be equal to:1
Drift=1/2 θσ u2, (5)
where θ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Taking σu=17%, see Sect. 2,
and θ=2, which is generally viewed as a reasonable value, we obtain an initial
upward drift in expected consumption of 2.9% per year. As a result of this
precautionary saving, the worker accumulates savings. When her career pro-
ceeds, her consumption gets increasingly paid for from the return on her sav-
ings, and her labour income becomes less relevant. Sooner or later, this makes
retirement optimal, simply because the income from wealth makes working a
meaningless effort.
1 The optimal consumption plan equates the expected marginal utility of consumption today
and tomorrow. The marginal utility of consumption at time t is Cθt . The due to the relative
risk aversion specification, consumption is proportional to the expected discounted value of life
time labour income. Hence, the equality of expected marginal utilities implies:
1= exp
(
− θ Dri f t +1/2 θ 2 σ u2
)
Taking logs and solving for Drift yields the expression in the text.
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The solution of the differential equation depends on current income, accu-
mulated savings, and the age of the individual. However, given the form of
the dynamic income process (a geometric Brownian, see Sect. 2) and assum-
ing a CRRA utility function, this partial differential equation can be simpli-
fied as to depend only on the ratio of accumulated savings to current income,
denoted R, see for example Teulings and De Vries (2006) for the case with
uncertainty in capital income. Bodie et al. (1992) and Bovenberg et al. (2007)
in this journal extend this model with transitory shocks to income, as dis-
cussed in “The Empirics of Income Dynamics”. While the differential equa-
tion of the original model of Teulings and De Vries has an explicit solution,
the extended model has not. However, the result that the solution depends
only on the ratio of savings to current income does still apply. Then, the opti-
mal savings rate s of an individual can be characterized as a function of the
ratio of savings to income R and the individual’s age t .
s =h (R, t)
Hence, R and t are sufficient statistics for calculating the optimal saving rate.
Keeping t fixed, the higher R, the lower s, because the accumulated wealth
allows a lower savings rate. Keeping R fixed, the older the worker, and the
higher is s, because there is less time left to save for retirement. During
the initial phase of the worker’s career, people save mainly for precaution-
ary motives. Later on in the career, people save for retirement, see Gourin-
chas and Parker (2002). After retirement, pensioners gradually deplete their
wealth. Hence, consumption follows the income process, but with a lag, and
more smoothed. On average, an individual’s consumption shows on average a
strong upward trend during the lifecycle, due to precaution.
When a worker faces a downward shock to his income that pushes up the
value of savings to income R, the worker responds by reducing his saving
rate, so that consumption tracks the fall in income only partially. In this way,
the pension rights accumulated during the working life are a reflection of all
shocks the worker has faced during his life. Depending on the precise way
the leisure enters workers preferences, optimal retirement decisions can also
be written as a function of the ratio R and the worker’s age t :
Retire if : g (R, t)>0
Keeping t fixed, the higher R, the higher g(R, t): accumulated savings make
it less attractive to continue working. Keeping R fixed, the older the worker
– a higher value of t-, the higher g, since the remaining lifetime is lower, so
that the accumulated wealth allows a higher level of consumption. Obviously,
both function, h(R, t) and g(R, t) are interrelated: the greater the preference
for retirement, the higher the demand for saving during the worker’s career.
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Bovenberg et al. (2007) provide numerical simulations that are required for
the calculation of the functions h(R, t) and g(R, t).
This analysis has far reaching implications for the optimal institutions
for social insurance, retirement and taxation. First, retirement and precau-
tionary saving for social security reasons should be an integrated system.
A downward shock in income today leads to reduced saving for retirement.
This lower saving is justified because the downward shock translates into a
reduction in the expected pension, while the previous accumulation of wealth
was aiming at a higher pension corresponding to the income level before
the downward shock. In this way, the worker smoothes the effect of the
downward shock to his current income over the consumption plan for his
whole remaining lifetime. Precautionary saving for self-insurance and saving
for retirement can only be optimal when they are administered in an inte-
grated saving account.
Second, savings accumulated for consumption smoothing over the lifecycle
should not be subject to wealth taxation. Wealth taxation distorts, because
future consumption is taxed more heavily than current consumption. Let t
be the tax rate on wage income, and let r be the tax rate on wealth. Then
marginal tax rate on consumption is 1− (1− t)(1− r)T , where T is the time
lag between earning and consumption. It is easy to see that this tax rate is
increasing in T . Though tax rates on wealth tend to be low, the effect can
be substantial due to a high value of T . For example, for reasonable values
of the marginal tax rates, e.g. t = 50% and r = 1.5%, the marginal tax rate
for current consumption is 50%, while the rate for consumption in 20 years
is 63%. Optimal smoothing of consumption across the life cycle requires the
marginal tax rate to be constant. This would call for a zero tax rate on
wealth. From this perspective, the current tax-treatment of pension contribu-
tions and benefits is optimal: tax benefits, and not contributions, and exempt
pension funds from wealth taxation. However, wealth taxation is a very effec-
tive means for containing the wealth distribution in the economy, see Pick-
ety (2003). Hence, one can understand why politicians prefer wealth taxation.
Hence, it is useful to have an instrument to disentangle wealth held for pre-
caution and retirement and wealth held for other reasons. Politicians want
to exempt the former from taxation, but to tax the latter. Here, the func-
tion h(R, t) can be helpful. It can be used to separate the wealth that one
is allowed to save for consumption smoothing purposes from other wealth.
This can be done in a recursive manner. At the start of the career, the per-
son’s wealth saved for precautionary saving is zero. Hence: R = 0. The func-
tion h(0, t) determines the maximum amount of savings she is allowed to
add to her integrated saving account during the first year, which is exempted
from taxation. To the extent that the individual realizes this saving this leads
to a new value of R > 0. Then the function h(R, t) determines the savings
rate for year two. And so on for later years. In this way, a country can
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simultaneously exempt wealth held for precautionary motives and retirement
from taxation, and tax other wealth.
All this analysis assumes that there is no objective and verifiable informa-
tion about unemployment, disability or other factors that affect the evolution
of labour income. To the extent that such information is available, this infor-
mation can be used to provide additional benefits (or, alternatively, tax cuts)
on top of the self-insurance provided by the integrated saving account.
If on top of the insurance provided by the tax system and by unem-
ployment and disability insurance, only self-insurance makes sense, then why
wouldn’t we take the word “self-insurance” literally, and leave this task to
the individual herself ? Though this is a perfectly logical position from point
of view of the standard assumptions of the neo-classical theory, my reading
of the empirical evidence on hyperbolic discounting and of the recent expe-
rience with individual DC pension schemes as have been introduced in the
US and the UK, is that financial planning and consumption smoothing turns
out to be a far too difficult task for most of us, including myself. Moreover,
we are plagued by hyperbolic discounting, postponing saving for ever since
we feel that it is better to start doing so tomorrow rather than today, and we
keep thinking so for ever. This asks for an institution that protects the self of
tomorrow against the self of today, by imposing a mandatory saving scheme.
This is exactly what pension funds do.
Whatever the reason that induced society to install pension fund, we take
their existence for granted in what follows. Then, the demand for self-insur-
ance and precautionary saving suggests that social security can best be inte-
grated in the pension contract by means of an integrated savings account. All
premiums of an individual to the pension fund are booked on this account,
all capital market returns on the savings that are accumulated in this way are
added to the account, and all benefits are paid from this account. An inter-
nal life insurance offered by the pension fund deals with longevity risk. The
fund has information on the two sufficient statistics for the calculation of the
optimal saving rate, the ratio of accumulated wealth to the labour income of
the individual R, and her age t . Hence, the fund can easily calculate the indi-
vidual’s optimal saving rate. Pension funds can adjust the contribution rate to
implement this optimal saving plan: when R goes up due to a fall in labour
income, contribution rates go down to mitigate the effect of the income shock
on consumption, and vice versa.
5 RISK TAKING, CAPITAL MARKETS, AND PENSION FUNDS
When social security is essentially an integrated savings account, we cannot
avoid the question as to how these savings should be invested. Is it the best
policy to invest all savings in risk free government bonds, or should some
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equity2 be included in the portfolio, and if so how much? Would labour
income be risk free so that all savings are dedicated to retirement and assum-
ing a CRRA utility function, the optimal policy would simply be to invest a
fixed share of your total wealth – the sum of human and financial capital in
wealth – in equity, see Teulings and De Vries (2006):





where π is the risk premium on holding equity and where σ is the volatil-
ity of equity. The higher the risk premium, the larger the share of equity in
the portfolio, the higher the volatility or the greater risk aversion, the smaller
the share of equity. For reasonable parameter values, e.g. the risk premium
π being equal to 4% per year and the volatility σ being equal to 20% per
year, the share of equity would be about 50%. This conclusion, that workers
should hold a fixed share of their total wealth in equity, has far reaching and
counterintuitive implications. Value of the human capital is equal to the net
discounted value of the workers expected future wage payments. Hence, this
human capital is at the maximum at the beginning of the career. Gradually,
this human capital is depleted. The wage the worker receives in exchange for
this depreciation is partly consumed, and partly saved for retirement, thereby
accumulating financial capital. However, since part of the wage income is con-
sumed, the depreciation of human capital exceeds the accumulation of finan-
cial capital. Hence, total wealth is at the maximum at the beginning of the
worker’s career. Since a fixed share of this wealth should be held in equity,
the investment in equity reaches a maximum at the beginning of the worker’s
career. During the life cycle, this wealth is gradually consumed, so that the
equity position should decline gradually.
In practice, this rule is hard to implement. Workers would have to borrow
large amounts at the start of their career, using their human capital as the
only collateral, and invest this loan in equity. Few lenders will accept such
collateral; few workers will be prepared to take so much risk at the beginning
of their career. Here, pension funds can play an important role. By manda-
tory participation rules, pension funds have better means to extract part of
the human capital of its participants as contributions. In this way, the pen-
sion fund is better able to use human capital as collateral for large loans to
finance equity positions than other lenders.
The path of consumption and saving implied by this optimal investment
rule is a geometric random walk. When there is a downward shock at the
stock market, workers respond by raising their saving rate to make up for the
loss on their equity holdings and hence by reducing their consumption. This
2 Here and beyond, we use the word equity here as acronym for the optimal risk bearing
portfolio in the sense of the Modigliani-Miller model.
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shift from consumption to saving is permanent. In this way the
negative effect of the fall in stock prices is smoothed over the remaining life-
cycle of the worker. Also from an aggregate demand perspective, this is a
desirable outcome, since shocks to equity prices have only a limited effect on
current consumption. To the extent that individuals are unable to make these
calculations properly – e.g. due to hyperbolic discounting-, the interference of
pension funds helps to stabilize the economy. Given the fact that all genera-
tions living at a particular point in time face the same stock market prices,
they are all affected in the same way, and hence they adjust their consump-
tion and saving in the same direction. However, the wealth of older gener-
ations has been affected by some early shocks that newer generations have
not experienced, simply because these new generations were not alive at that
moment. Hence, saving rates of different generations move parallel, but do
not coincide. If older generations have faced some early negative shocks, they
still have to make up for these losses, and hence they save more than younger
generations who have not faced these shocks, and vice versa for the case the
older generations have faced early positive shocks. Like in the case of uncer-
tainty in labour income, the uncertainty in the return on equity implies that
workers will invest part of the excess return on equity in extra savings for
precautionary reasons. Hence, expected consumption will rise in the optimal
path, see Caballero (1990).
In theory, pension funds should execute these optimal saving and invest-
ment policies on behalf of their participants, see Teulings and De Vries (2006).
For younger generations, they should invest large amounts in equity, even
more than the financial capital these generations have accumulated. For older
generations pension funds should hold some share of the accumulated savings
in bonds. For retirees, the only wealth is financial capital, so we can directly
apply the rule in Eq. (6), so that about 50% of their wealth should be invested
in equity. This goes against the notion applied by many pension funds that
participants are exposed to investment risk till date of retirement, and then
at the date of retirement the worker is supposed to sell all equity and to buy
a completely risk free annuity. As a share of their financial wealth, retirees
should hold less equity, but not zero.
Contribution rates of various generations at a particular point in time will
be generally different, depending on investment history that a generation has
experienced. Generations that started saving for the pension in bull market of
the eighties face a lower contribution rate in this system than generations who
that started in the beer market of the seventies. Currently, one of the corner-
stones of pension funds’ policy is to charge all generations the same contribu-
tion rate. From the point of view of insurance, the differences in contribution
rates across generations at a particular point in time suggests that some gains
from trade in investment risk remain unexploited, for if the contribution rates
of various generations differ randomly (depending on the shocks that were
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only experienced by the older generations), then there is a market for pooling
these risks across generations. Why is this type of insurance no part of the
derived optimal saving and investment policy of the pension fund? The rea-
son is that there is a missing market for investment in equity. When younger
generations could have decided on a saving and investment plan that maxi-
mizes their expected lifetime utility, they would have invested in equity even
before they entered the labour market, or even before they were born, see
Teulings and De Vries (2006) for an extensive discussion. In fact, the same
rule in Eq. (6) applies, namely that an unborn generation should invest a fixed
share of the net discounted value of its future human capital in equity. In this
way, the unborn generations diversify risk optimally over time, that is, over
all realizations of shocks to equity prices. This yields the optimal trade off
between excess return and risk taking. Under that rule, all generations would
face the same history of shocks to the stock market, and hence their con-
tribution rates would be the same. Pension funds do actually charge all gen-
erations the same contribution rate (at least in the Netherlands). There are
three interpretations of this practice. The first interpretation is that pension
funds simply have no adequate policies to absorb the risk on their holdings of
equity. There is some truth in this interpretation, because an optimal policy
for absorbing risks would be to let the contribution rate vary with stock
market fluctuations. Most pension funds prefer to keep the contribution rate
constant, but there is no alternative for changing the rate. The second inter-
pretation is more positive, namely that pension funds do actually provide
this type of insurance across generations, by investing in equity on behalf of
unborn generations. There is also some truth in this interpretation, in that
pension funds that raise their contribution rates in response to a negative
stock market shock charge higher contribution rates, also to new generations
who did not participate in the fund when the shock hit the market. The third
interpretation is that pension funds cannot apply this type of policies, because
it would imply that after a negative shock to equity prices, new generations
would enter the fund with a negative wealth. New generations could simply
refuse to participate, which would lead to the collapse of the system. Obvi-
ously, there is also some truth in this interpretation.
The options for committing future generations to investment policies that
were optimal ex ante but worked out unfavourably ex post, is limited. The
new generation is likely to reject the inheritance of the investment done in
the past on their behalf. Mandatory participation can force them to accept,
but whether that works after a sequence of severe negative shocks remains
to be seen. New generations will do everything they can to avoid having to
bear the burden of the negative wealth, by not entering the fund. If they suc-
ceed, the incumbent generations are left with losses. Is there a policy that on
the one hand benefits from this intergenerational risk sharing by investing on
behalf of future generations, while on the other hand avoiding the risk that
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new generations are not willing to accept the negative outcome in case of bad
luck? The critical case is whether a new generation is willing to enter in the
worst possible case. For a case to be the worst case, it must be true that a
pension fund does not hold any equity, since by definition, holding equity
implies that things can get even worse. This restriction of not holding equity
immediately poses a problem for a new generation who considers whether it
is worthwhile to enter, since the optimal investment rule without intergen-
erational risk sharing would require this generation to invest massively in
equity, see our previous discussion. However, the new generation has some
advantage from participating in a fund that charges all generations the same
contribution, since these higher premiums will benefit them because these pre-
miums lead to a gradual recovery of the pension fund’s wealth. This recov-
ery allows future reductions in contribution rates. Older generations also pay
these higher contribution rates, but they do not share as much in the benefits
because they are death by that time.
Whether or not intergenerational risk sharing – while observing the con-
straint that new generations must be prepared to enter the fund even in the
worst possible situation – is feasible is still an open question for me. If it
is feasible, it will not be easy. Therefore, it is useful to consider how a pen-
sion fund would look like that would not try to benefit from this type of
intergenerational risk sharing. Then contribution rates of various generations
would move parallel, but at different levels. To the extent that pension funds
are going to offer integrated savings accounts that combine social security
and pensions, they move away from an equal contribution rate even within
a generation, since the contribution rate would depend on the history of the
individual income process. Then, there is no objection at all to also allowing
contribution rates to vary between generations. Hence, one would expect pen-
sion funds to move away from fixed contribution rates and intergenerational
risk sharing when social security and pension get integrated.
Does the interaction of stock market and human capital risk affect the
optimal holding of equity during the lifecycle? Is it still true that a worker’s
investment in equity should be at the maximum at the beginning of their
career? As a first observation, the stock market risk and the individual spe-
cific risk in human capital are uncorrelated by construction. Hence, the rule
for the share of wealth to be held in equity, see Eq. (6), still applies, see
Bovenberg et al. (2007). However, the value of human capital is substantially
less, since it is a risky asset. Though the risk is uncorrelated to the aggregate
risk, it cannot be insured, by the incompleteness of capital markets: insur-
ing human capital would eliminate the incentives for providing effort. Hence,
one should apply some kind of risk adjusted discount rate. The risk premium
drives up this discount rate, thereby reducing the net discounted value of the
human capital, and hence, the amount of equity to be held at the beginning
of the career. During the career, risky human capital is partly consumed, and
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partly transformed in financial capital, thereby eliminating the risk discount
in the human capital. This transformation might, therefore, even increase the
value of the total wealth, even though part of the depreciation of the human
capital is used for consumption. Hence, the amount of equity to be held
might even increase during the first phase of the career. As a second obser-
vation, to the extend that aggregate risk in human capital is correlated to
the stock prices, and this correlation can be expected to be substantial in the
long run, human capital should be counted as a substitute for holding equity.
Hence, young generations with a lot of human capital should hold less equity
than discussed hitherto.
Finally, we consider two extensions to the optimal investment and con-
sumption rules discussed till so far. First, most people buy a house at some
stage in their career. This asset is a major component of the total portfolio
they hold, and it is a risky asset, of which the value is correlated to equity.
Likewise, the mortgage that is taken up to finance the house is also an impor-
tant component in that wealth. Ideally, a pension fund should, therefore, con-
sider the value of a worker’s house when deciding how much equity to hold
for that individual. The higher the value of the house, the smaller the holding
of equity.
Second, the discussion till so far was based on the assumption of a CRRA
utility function. This type of utility function penalizes the subject for vari-
ability in consumption; it does not penalize her for changes in consumption
as such. Thus, a worker is indifferent between the consumption pattern from
year 1 to 6 of 1-1-1-2-2-2 and the pattern 1-2-1-2-1-2, since the variability in
both patterns is equal, even though there are more changes in consumption
in the second pattern. There is some evidence to suggest that in fact workers
do prefer pattern 1 above pattern 2, due to habit formation in consumption,
see Constantinides (1990). When you got used to drinking champagne, it is
hard to live a day without. Changing habits is costly, and hence, workers try
to stabilize consumption even more than they do in case of just standard risk
aversion, by smoothing a shock over their remaining lifetime. Hence, a neg-
ative shock to either human capital or wealth is not smoothed equally over
all future consumption. Smoothing goes even beyond that, in that we adjust
our consumption after a e.g. 3% negative shock to our wealth by 1% the
first year, an additional 1% in the second year (so, that is 2% in the second
year in total), and again in the third year, and 0.5% in the fourth year and
beyond (so, 3.5% in total). So, adjustment is postponed, by taking a smaller
adjustment in the first year in exchange for a higher adjustment in year four
and beyond. This implies that youngsters can take up more risk than elderly,
because for them there are still many years left beyond year 4, while for
elderly there are not that many years left. Hence, the implication of habit
formation is that elderly can take less risk, since they have a shorter period
left to adjust their consumption to the new level. From an aggregate demand
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perspective, habit formation helps stabilizing the economy, since consumption
is fairly stable in the short run.
6 CONCLUSIONS
65 Years after the publication of the Beveridge report, we might be willing to
reconsider the fundamentals of our social security system. The experience of
the ‘70 and the ‘80 of the previous century has taught us that incentives mat-
ter. Our income is reasonably described by a geometric random walk, where
each shock has a persistent effect on your income during the rest of our life.
It is tempting to interpret this phenomenon as a consequence of the knowl-
edge economy, where the value of our human capital is not just the market
wage for labour in general, but the specific knowledge that we accumulated
during our lifetime, and that forms the starting point for picking up new
ideas. This interpretation is supported by the fact that income looks more like
a random walk for college graduates than for high school drop outs. There is
an alternative interpretation of the data that states that the return to expe-
rience differs widely across individuals. Some invest early in life and would
receive a steep return afterwards, others choose for a much flatter profile.
This interpretation of the data generates a much smaller demand for insur-
ance, because wide differences in income profiles are largely due to deliberate
choices by individuals. Though the data provide insufficient information to
rule out the possibility of heterogeneity in the return to experience, we focus
on the more parsimonious model where income follows a random walk in this
paper.
The persistent character of shocks asks for a rethinking of social secu-
rity systems. First, firms should bear as much as possible the firm risk on
the firm specific capital, since shareholders can better diversify this risk on
international capital markets. Only to the extent that firms cannot adequately
observe or verify the worker’s specific investment, some of the cost of invest-
ment – and hence also some of its revenue – should be transferred to the
worker. However, this requires that workers can commit not to bargain on
future surpluses if the firm does well.
Second, the persistent nature of most income shocks makes that we should
put a much greater emphasis on self-insurance and the integration of social-
security and pensions. A classical pension fund had one account, to which
all received contributions were added and from which all paid pension ben-
efits were subtracted. Teulings and De Vries (2006) have raised a plea for
separate accounts for each generation. This paper pushes that argument one
step further, by making an argument in favour of truly individual accounts
that allow a proper integration of social security and pensions. Such a pen-
sion fund can still benefit from returns to scale in asset allocation, by having
two investment accounts, one with the best possible risk free portfolio, and
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the other with the optimal risk bearing portfolio (“equity” in the wording
of the paper), all in the spirit of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. Each indi-
vidual account would then contain a proper mix of “shares” in both the
risk free and in the risk bearing portfolio, where the mix depends on the
characteristics of the individual, elderly participants bearing less risk than
youngsters. The pension fund would set a default contribution rule that simul-
taneously accounts for optimal self-insurance and precaution, and for saving
for a pension for retirement. Probably, the government should have a say in
these rules, since they are at least partly mandatory, since pension funds are
exempted from wealth taxation, and since the government has an interest in
making sure that everybody will receive at least some income in the final stage
of her life, to avoid that people raise claims for income support against the
government. However, one can think of trade unions playing a major role in
setting these rules. These issues have to be filled out on the way. However, this
general line of thinking about the role of pension funds would be a major
improvement in the way society deals with social security.
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